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INTRODUCTION

Through a happy serendipity Frank Snyder, of Texas Wesleyan University School of Law, happened to be doing some research on the
web when he ran across documents suggesting that an urban renewal
project was rebuilding a flour mill in Gloucester, England. After
some additional research, he concluded that this building, long known
as "Priday's Mill," was, in fact, Joseph and Jonah Hadley's old City

Flour Mills. By coincidence this happened to be on the eve of the
150th anniversary of the case in which that mill figured prominently,

Hadley v. Baxendale.1 Though the case is likely known by name to
most lawyers (as in "the rule of.

.

."), Gloucester officials, and even

local historians were oblivious to the connection between their mill
and this monument of contract law-until, that is, the fertile and creative Frank raised with them the possibility of co-sponsoring the sparkling conference on Hadley, "The Common Law of Contracts as a
World Force in Two Ages of Revolution," that Frank organized in
Gloucester in the summer of 2004.
t Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. A.B., Cornell, 1960;
J.D., 1963. Editorial Reviser, Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Editing the Second Restatement gave me the great opportunity to work closely with its Reporter,
Professor E. Allan Farnsworth, who had been my teacher and became my friend.
Allan died this year, and I am honored to dedicate this Essay to him.
1. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022
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If I tried to discuss all the papers, I would give them only a superficial reference; there are too many to cover with any depth. I did, however, want to discuss some fine examples of the conference and then
consider the broader issues that they raise about Hadley as an artifact
of the common law, both the common law of the mid-nineteenth century and the common law of the early twenty-first. As the title of the
conference suggests, Hadley illustrates how wide-ranging and intertwined the common law is, both in geographic and cultural terms and
in terms of its flexibility as the world around us changes.
II.

HADLEY-AND THE INFLUENCE OF CONTEXT (HEREIN OF
RICHARD DANZIG, PRYOR & HOSHAUER, JOSEPH
PERILLO AND JOSEPH POTHIER)

At the risk of stating the obvious for many readers, please allow me
to review Hadley briefly. On May 12, 1853, Joseph and Jonah Hadley, trading as the City Flour Mills, discovered that the crank shaft on
their mill had broken, and the next day gave it to Pickford & Co., "the
well-known carriers," to transport it across England to Greenwich "as
a pattern for a new one."'2 Pickfords misconsigned the shaft and
delayed its replacement by five days, causing the Hadleys a considerable loss of profits. The Hadleys sued Pickfords's managing director,
Joseph Baxendale, claiming damages of £300. Witnesses testified to a
£120 loss, the jury gave damages of £50, and the Court of Exchequer,
on a rule nisi (essentially a motion for new trial), gave a rule absolute,
and remanded the case for a new trial, directing the trial judge to instruct the jury that "they ought not to take the
loss of profits into
'3
consideration at all in estimating the damages."
To justify this instruction the court put forth the famous rule of

Hadley v. Baxendale:
[T]he [Hadleys'] loss of profits... cannot reasonably be considered
such a consequence of the breach of contract as could have been
fairly and reasonably contemplated by both the parties when they
made this contract. For such loss would neither have flowed naturally from the breach of this contract in the great multitude of cases
occurring under ordinary circumstances, nor were the special circumstances, which perhaps would have made it a reasonable and
natural consequence of such breach of contract, communicated to
or known by the defendants.4
In today's words of the Restatement Second of Contracts:
2. Id. at 147.
3. Id. at 147-48. Baxendale had paid £25 into court, apparently conceding liability. Id. at 147.
4. Id. at 151.
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(1) Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach
did not have reason to foresee as the probable result of the
breach when the contract was made.
(2) Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it follows from the breach
(a) in the ordinary course of events, or
(b) as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary
course of events, that the party in breach had reason to
know.
5

The papers in this issue discuss the substance and historical context
of Hadley at length, but any contextual discussion of Hadley must also
consider the contribution of Richard Danzig. Danzig-in various embodiments Stanford law professor, Secretary of the Navy, and Washington insider-wrote a famous paper thirty years ago6 that showed
how Hadley reflected the Industrial Revolution, which was then at its
peak in transforming England from the bucolic, traditional, small scale
and status-based villages of Jane Austen to the commercial, dynamic,
teeming and contract-based cities of Charles Dickens. Danzig's thesis
is that the pre-industrial English legal system, with only fifteen royal
judges for the whole country 7 and many decisions like the assessment
of damages left to the discretion of local juries, had to be reined in by
rules to create the uniformity and predictability needed by the new
national economy.
III.

PRYOR AND HOSHAUER, PURITANISM AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH CONTRAC- LAW

In the present collection of papers, C. Scott Pryor and Glenn M.
Hoshauer question the thesis of several writers that contract was
strongly influenced by English Protestantism in general and Puritanism in particular.8 They suggest that most of the changes in contract
during the years before the eighteenth century were due less to the
Puritan Revolution than to changes in forms and court jurisdiction,
together with pressures from contract practice. They agree with
Danzig about the need for centralization in light of the small number
of royal judges and an industrial (as well as religious) revolution.
5.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 351 (1981).

6. Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrializationof the
Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (1975).

7. The three "Superior Courts," Common Pleas, Queen's Bench, and Exchequer-each with five judges-handled only about 2,400 cases per year, many in
London and some at Assizes held in major provincial towns for about eight weeks a
year. The inferior County Courts handled nearly 750,000, and while many of these
were routine debt collections, Danzig estimates that the County Courts handled many
times the non-routine cases handled by the royal judges at Assizes. Id. at 267-70.
8. C. Scott Pryor & Glenn M. Hoshauer, The PuritanRevolution and the Law of
Contract, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 291 (2005).
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However, they place the pressures hundreds of years earlier than
Danzig.9 They show that there was an earlier industrial revolution in
Elizabethan times, and that even then-beginning in 1560-the central legal system was challenged,1 0 with the London judges imposing
rules, particularly about contract conditions, on local juries-the
Danzig thesis pushed back by nearly three centuries. While the authors are skeptical about many of the alleged connections between
Puritan theology and contracts, they do support the idea that concepts
like the foreseeability rule are products of their times and social factors, not just economic ones but cultural ones like religion and politics.
But where did this rule that damages had to be foreseeable come
from? In this present collection, Joseph Perillo argues, in detail and
persuasively, that it came from the writings of the eighteenth century
French treatise writer Robert Joseph Pothier. l1 Professor Perillo
shows how Pothier influenced Lord Mansfield, Chancellor Kent, and
writers on each side of the Atlantic, before and since Hadley, and concludes by musing on the insularity of the modern common law. l"
Professor Perillo is concerned, as we see, not only with history and
legal theory but with the interaction of legal systems. Though the
common law is, by far the minority system compared with the civil
law, it is increasingly influential in transnational law and the law of
developing countries.

IV.

ANDREW TETrENBORN AND FORESEEABILITY IN TORT AND
CONTRACT DAMAGES

Andrew Tettenborn is also concerned with interaction, but of a different kind, the relationship of contract and tort, which Grant Gilmore gave the tongue in cheek name "contorts." 13 Professor
Tettenborn puts forth a straightforward argument that the rule of
14
Hadley v. Baxendale should be applied equally to most tort cases.
Hadley is the contractual analog to proximate cause. It is the device
that cuts off liability despite a clear "but-for" connection. Professor
Tettenborn adeptly considers the arguments why different or similar
standards should be used in the two areas; he does not discuss the fact
that his solution would pretty clearly limit tort liability, thus saving
9. I suspect that Danzig has no disagreement with them on these basic matters.
10. Pryor & Hoshauer, supra note 8, at 307-08.
11. Joseph M. Perillo, Robert J. Pothier'sInfluence on the Common Law of Contract, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 267 (2005). Danzig had acknowledged A.W. Brian
Simpson's earlier argument to this effect, see A.W.B. Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law, 91 LAw Q. REV. 247, 276 (1975), but had largely rejected it. See Danzig, supra note 6, at 185; Perillo at 276.
12. Perillo, supra note 11.
13. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRAcr 98 (Ronald K. L. Collins

ed., rev. ed. 1995) (1974).
14. Andrew Tettenborn, Hadley v. Baxendale: ContractDoctrine or Compensation
Rule?, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 505 (2005).
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entrepreneurs money at the expense of accident victims. The political
desirability of a contraction of liability is beyond the scope of this Essay. But the question whether there should be one standard of causation sends us to Cardozo's dictum (or should we call it underlying
principle?) in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. 5 : "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed ....."I' This
does sound like a tort equivalent of the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale.
Palsgraf,as we all learn, is not a proximate cause case at all; it holds
that the railroad had no duty of care to a waiting passenger across the
tracks and at the other end of the station.17 But as Judge Andrews
showed in his Palsgrafdissent, the extent of duty and the limits of
proximate cause are two sides of a coin.18 And the restrictions on
consequential liability are, if you like, the edge of the coin. The various aspects have been raised by cases on the borders of tort and contract. In some instances the courts have generally opted for a
contract-like approach, like the economic loss cases, where a party
tries, generally unsuccessfully, to use strict tort liability or proximate
cause to recover what seems more like a breach of warranty claim
involving only economic loss.' 9 On the other hand, the Second Circuit
applied Palsgrafand not some variant on Hadley in the famous In re
Kinsman Transit Co.,2 involving a bizarre set of circumstances in
which a barge rammed a bridge, causing a backup of ice that blocked
a river and prevented the complaining vessels from plying their trade.
The Second Circuit was bound by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins2
to apply Palsgraf in Kinsman. That does not mean that the court
could not have found a way to hold Palsgrafnot applicable, given the
complicated circumstances, and the fact that it was dealing with a
bankruptcy and not a diversity case. The court, however, speaking
thorough Judge Henry Friendly, opted to apply Palsgrafand found
liability.2 2 The Colorado Supreme Court was not so bound in Vanderbeek v. Vernon Corp.2 3 In that case, the court had a case that was very
much on the edge between contract and tort, and it did consider Hadley as well as issues of proximate cause in the business tort context.2 4
The Vanderbeek interests had wrongfully garnished money that the
Vernon Corp. claimed it would have used for a profitable investment
that it lost because of the delay. The issue, then, was whether the
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
COLO.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
Id. at 100.
Id. at 99-101.
See id. at 101-05 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
See Craig K. Lawler, Foreseeability and the Economic Loss Rule (pt. 1), 33
LAW. 81 (2004).
338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See In re Kinsman, 338 F.2d at 722-27.
50 P.3d 866 (Colo. 2002).
Id. at 873-75.
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damages were limited to interest on the money or the much greater
consequential loss. While this case literally involved a business tort
rather than a breach of contract, the court had described the underlying dispute as coming out of an economic relationship between the
parties, thus putting it well within the kind of dealings that could be
analyzed using a Hadley-type of foreseeability.2" Business torts are in
many ways closer to contract law than tort, and this is the type of case
that Professor Tettenborn shows could be analyzed using Hadley.
Nonetheless, after reviewing cases and writers on the issues raised
by contract/tort overlap, the Colorado court held that
consequential damages are recoverable in torts of economic interference, such as the wrongful attachment here. As in any other tort
action, the appropriate measure of the damage a victim of an economic tort may recover is that amount which is the natural and
probable result of the injury sustained by virtue of the tortious act.
In order to be recoverable, such damages must be proximately
26
caused by the tortious act and must be reasonably ascertainable.
Thus, the court had "a choice between competing standards of foreseeability, ' ' 27 and though it spoke of consequential damages, language
of contract damages appropriate for a Hadley damage limitation analysis, the court chose a tort proximate cause approach.2 8 Perhaps the
answer to the approach put forth by Professor Tettenborn, is the comment of the Second Circuit in a federal securities fraud claim under
SEC Rule 10b-5:
In the end, whether loss causation has been demonstrated presents
a public policy question, the resolution of which is predicated upon
notions of equity because it establishes who, if anyone, along the
causal chain should be liable for the plaintiffs' losses .... A finding
of foreseeability must satisfy the judicial
mind that such result con29
forms to "a rough sense of justice.',
Judge Andrews's "rough sense of justice" is appealing.3 ° In a sense
it leaves issues of damages to a jury's sense of fairness, a position espoused, at least in 1970, by that relentlessly middle-of-the-road

25. See id.
26. Id. at 875.
27. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80
REV.

CAL.

L.

563, 567 (1992).

28. Vanderbeek, 50 P.3d at 875.
29. Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 96 (2d
Cir. 2001) (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)).
30. Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting). At least it is appealing to
me. See Peter Linzer, Rough Justice:A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts
and Torts, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 695.
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scholar of contracts, Allan Farnsworth.3
approach that Hadley abandoned.
V.

MARA KENT AND

This, of course is the very

NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES (A/K/A

MORE CONTORTS)

Professor Mara Kent looks at non-economic damages, particularly
emotional injuries, and concludes that an honest use of the Hadley
foreseeability test would allow recovery in many of the cases, particularly when they involved insurance, personal, and family contracts.3 2
But the general bar to mental anguish damages (as well as the bar on
punitive damages) is not primarily based on their non-foreseeability.3 a
They are based on the basic (though questionable) notion that breach
of contract is not a tort. This, in turn, owes a great deal to Holmes in
The Path of the Law,34 particularly his famous aphorism:
The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it-and nothing
more. If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory
sum. If you commit a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the
difference. But such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the
nostrils of those who think
35 it advantageous to get as much ethics
into the law as they can.
It is because of this view of the difference between contract and tort
that the Second Restatement allows punitive damages only if "the
conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable. 3a6 As far as emotional damages are concerned,
the restatement is not quite as explicit: "Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm
or the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional
disturbance was a particularly likely result. 3 a7 But in its Comments it
notes that the bodily injury situation may almost always be regarded
as one in tort.3 8 As to the second, it simply reiterates the importance
31. E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L.

REV. 1145, 1199 (1970) (approving the apparent compromise award by the jury in
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 906
(1963). I cannot tell if Professor Farnsworth adhered to this position. The last edition
of his treatise refers to the compromise verdict, but makes no judgment about it. See
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.13, at 791 n.16 (4th ed. 2004).
32. See generally Mara Kent, The Common-Law History of Non-Economic Damages in Breach of Contract Actions Versus Willful Breach of ContractActions, 11 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 481 (2005).

33. On the interaction between consequential and non-economic damages, see
Bohac v. Dep't of Agric., 239 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
34. OW. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
35. Id. at 462.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981).
37. Id. § 353.
38. Id. § 353 cmt. a.
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of the "particularly likely result," suggesting that contracts of carriers
and innkeepers, and contracts involving dead bodies or death
messages (for which recovery of emotional damages are allowed) are
different from other contracts, even though the breach of many other
contracts might lead to bankruptcy or financial ruin, which in turn
"may by chance cause even more severe emotional disturbance." 3 9 It
seems clear enough that the relationships in these specialized contracts are also much closer to those raising tort duties. For centuries
common carriers and innkeepers have had a status-based obligation to
accept customers and to treat them well, and telegraph companies
were early treated as a regulated industry. Thus, their duties to customers arguably are created less by contract than by the legal system
itself, the essence of tort. Thus, the traditional categories allowing
emotional injury damages or punitive damages do make sense in a
world of a dichotomy between tort and breach of contract.
But what about other, more commercial contracts where one party
is in the power of the other, like the classic, though now overruled,
Seamen's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.?4 Seamen's
Direct involved a man trying to develop a marina who was driven into
insolvency by an oil company that "stonewalled" its contractual obligations though it knew he could not afford to challenge the breach
and would be driven out of business. The California Supreme Court
upheld the imposition of punitive damages for what was deemed a tort
of bad faith breach. This tort came out of insurance cases, in which
the relationship is at least a quasi-fiduciary one, and when the later
Supreme Court overruled Seamen's Direct it indicated that it was not
41
overruling precedents about bad faith in insurance contract cases.
The overruling of Seamen's Direct has put California back with almost all states, 42 but, again, the reason is not foreseeability or, I think
efficiency, but a public policy against extensive damages in business
contracts, a policy that is often expressed, but not to my mind conclusively justified. It really turns on whether we want to dissuade contracting parties from deliberately breaching when they are in a
dominant position and can ruin the opposite party.4 3 Professor Kent
expresses some doubt about allowing damages for willful breach because she fears it would interfere with "efficient breach of contract,"
39. Id.
40. 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984), overruled by Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil
Co., 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995).
41. See Freeman & Mills, Inc., 900 P.2d at 679-80.
42. FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, § 12.8, at 763.
43. Another way of accomplishing this is by the use of default rules, perhaps a
presumption of bad faith when the dominant party breaches at great collateral cost to
the other. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). Ayres and
Gertner analyze Hadley as creating a "penalty default" that forces a party to disclose
risks that might induce the other to demand a higher price as insurance against his
extended liability if he defaults. Id. at 90-95.
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conceding in a footnote that "not all scholars agree with the economists' theory of efficient breach."" Curiously, former California
Chief Justice Rose Bird concurred specially in Seamen's Direct. because she, too, was concerned about interfering with efficient breach.
She supported punitives in the situation of the egregious deliberate
breach, but made clear that she would limit the intrusion on the privilege to breach to situations in which the breaching party could easily
see that ruin would result.4 5 Once again, though, we can see that the
issue has to do with the nature of the particular contract or relationship, not the nature of contract generally.

VI.

IRMA RUSSELL, THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMMONS AND THE
TRAGEDY OF CONTRACT REMEDIES

The nature of the contract is emphasized by Irma Russell's discussion of the problem of enforcement of land developers' promises in
connection with permits to use environmentally vulnerable public
lands like lakes and wetlands.4 6 The Army Corps of Engineers and
other federal and state governmental agencies use contract as a way to
permit some development with offsetting benefits to the environment
paid for by the developer. The developer promises to do these positive goods as a tradeoff, but then reneges, relying on the fact that the
government is too busy to enforce the contract, or has changed its
mind about the environment, and that there is little incentive for an
individual to shoulder the costs of enforcement for essentially no gain.
Professor Russell flips Garrett Hardin's famous The Tragedy of the
Commons to apply his reasoning not to the incentive to the individual
to overuse the common land but to the disincentives to the ordinary
citizen to enforce the promises made and broken by the users of the
commons. This is perceptive, and it illustrates the essential role of
remedies in the contract regime.
It is not the device of contract that is the problem in environmental
and other social uses of contract; it is the niggardliness of remedies.4 7
44. Kent, supra note 32, at 498, n.125. For criticisms of the efficient breach concept, see generally Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1989); Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract:Circles in the Sky, 68 VA.
L. REV. 947 (1982). I am one of the critics. PETER LINZER, A CONTRAcTs ANTHOLOGY 605-07 (2d ed. 1995); Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract RemediesEfficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 114 (1981).
45. Seamen's Direct Buying Serv., Inc., 686 P.2d at 1170-77 (Bird, C.J., concurring
and dissenting).
46. Irma Russell, A Common Tragedy: The Breach of Promises To Benefit the
Public Commons and the Enforceability Problem, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 557
(2005).
47. See generally Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J.
271 (1979); Linzer, supra note 44. Defenders of the status quo include Edward Yorio,
In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1365
(1982) and Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351
(1978).
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The problem raised by Professor Russell was approached in another
creative way by Anthony Jon Waters in his well-known article on third
party beneficiary contracts, The Property In the Promise.48 Waters
showed that after the courts had made it difficult to establish a private
right to enforce a federal statute, enterprising courts and lawyers used
third party beneficiary theory to permit private enforcement. Thus, in
Zigas v. Superior Court49 a real estate developer had received a fed-

eral subsidy and in exchange had agreed to observe a schedule of
maximum rents. He breached and the federal government failed to
bring suit, but the tenants were allowed to sue as the intended beneficiaries of the contract between the United States and the developer.
Professor Russell mentions this approach, and it is one way to get
around the standing issues raised by cases like Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife5" in which the Supreme Court not only took a narrow view of
what satisfied standing requirements, but suggested that the justiciability requirements of Article III of the United States Constitution limited Congress's power to confer standing on private citizens.
Congress could, in its licenses and contracts for wetland development
and other environmental and social concerns, expressly state that the
contract was for the benefit of users of wetlands or even for the benefit of all Americans. This might or might not work 51-the majority on
the contemporary Supreme Court has shown hostility to private enforcement of social legislation. But it would be a start.
Professor Russell's article implicates broader questions, particularly
involving Hadley. She shows the impact of remedial procedures on
the effectiveness of contract as a social device. It is not just the small
possibility of gain that dissuades individuals from enforcing public
contracts. Many would act altruistically, but enforcement is hampered
by the American Rule, requiring them to pay their attorneys' fees
even if successful; limits on class actions; and the risks of sanctions
when they try to extend the law or get around a hostile precedent. On
top of this is the common law's limitation of damages and its reluctance to grant specific performance. Some of these can be dealt with
directly: Congress can provide for attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs or even give them a bounty for protecting the public fisc; Congress and the courts can be more willing to grant and find standing,
48. Anthony John Waters, The Property in the Promise:A Study of the Third Party
Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985).
49. 174 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1981).
50. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
51. Whether this would clear the procedural hurdles raised by the Supreme Court
is questionable. The majority opinion in Lujan says that there are constitutional limits to Congress's ability to create standing, and Justices Kennedy and Souter, in their
concurrence in Lujan, say that the requirement of a concrete injury "is not just an
empty formality." 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring in
part concurring in the judgment). Yet, by expressing Congress's intention to benefit
citizens, Congress. would have shown that the failure to perform did create a concrete
injury in members of the general public.
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and the courts can and should be wary about using sanctions against
those putting forth new or unpopular theories of law.
But note how the traditional limits of contract remedies cut against
enforcement. Despite liberalization, specific performance is still disfavored in contract,52 and if specific performance is not granted, the
damage rules will not make the plaintiff whole. 3 For instance, we
have come to appreciate the importance to all of us of wetlands, but if
damages were sought for breach of a wetlands development contract,
a claim for the consequential damages caused by the failure to carry
out a promise about alternative wetlands would run directly into Hadley's foreseeability rules. Thus, here as in other situations, Hadley illustrates the interaction of contract, the common law, a changing
domestic society and a changing world economy and ecology.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Today, as Professor Perillo points out, we are in the middle of an
era of globalization like that of the enlightenment that spawned
Pothier and led to the Industrial Revolution.54 Even more we are in
the middle of a cyber/information revolution accelerating change in
this multinational and transnational economy. Just as the Hadley lawyers and judges looked to a French writer and to Article 1150 of the
French Civil Code, today, we might look to such transnational authorities as the United Nations Convention on the International Sale
of Goods (the CISG)56 , the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts, various civil codes, and increasingly the case
law of other countries. But up to now, Americans especially have
been reluctant to do so. This has begun to change, slowly, led, by
52. FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, §§12.4-.7.
53. The obvious example is Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d
109 (Okla. 1962), in which, admittedly, specific performance was not sought. On this
problem, see Judith L. Maute, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. Revisited:
The Ballad of Willie and Lucille, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1341, 1372-73 (1995); Linzer,
supra note 44, at 118-20.
54. Perillo, supra note 11, at 290.
55. Then and now, Article 1150 reads "Le d6biteur n'est tenu que des dommages
et intdrets qui ont dtd prdvus ou qu'on a pu prdvoir lors du contrat, lorsque ce n'est
point par son dol que l'obligation n'est point ex6cutde." ("The debtor is held liable
only for damages and interests that were foreseen or that one could have foreseen at
the time of contracting, when it is not by his bad faith that the obligation was not
carried out.") This is my translation, but I borrow Professor Perillo's translation of
"dol" as bad faith. "Wrongful act" might be another translation. See Perillo, supra
note 11, at 276.
56. The CISG is binding on sales of goods involving parties whose places of business are in different States (i.e., nations), both of which are Contracting Parties to the
Convention. CISG Art. 1. See, e.g., MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr. v. Ceramica Nuova
D'Agostino, S.P.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that the parol evidence rule was inapplicable to a dispute governed by the CISG because of its Article
8(3)). On this case, see FARNSWORTH, supra note 31, § 7.3, at 423-24 n.36.
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justices of the United States Supreme Court,57 over, it should be
noted, vociferous objections by their colleagues.
Even more striking, however, is the impact of Anglo-American law
on third world countries. As Perillo points out, English is now the
lingua franca of the world, and in many former British colonies the
multiplicity of native languages causes English to be the primary language of the law.5 9 Many third world nations have enacted civil codes
rather than try to use our idiosyncratic common law, most notably
China, which used the German code as its model. But Chinese lawyers increasingly study in the United States; thus, becoming familiar
with the common law approach. Anglophone, Africa has imposed a
common law court system on traditional and religious law, and India
and Pakistan, with populations totaling over a billion, have common
law systems with their best lawyers typically studying in England.
An illustration of the overlay of the common law on the developing
world was the notorious case of a Nigerian woman who gave birth two
years after being divorced against her will and was convicted of adultery and sentenced to death by stoning. 60 The case got worldwide attention and was a great embarrassment to the Nigerian federal
government, but ran into the government's decision to decentralize
authority. The woman lived in the Muslim north and had been tried
under the Islamic sha'ria. The Nigerian President was appalled, but
could not interfere without undermining the decentralization program. The case, however, went up on appeal, and the appellate court,
with judges in wigs and gowns, solemnly found a commentary on the
Koran that suggested that pregnancy might last up to five years.
Based on this "finding," the court solemnly and with a straight face
found that the woman might have been pregnant by her husband at
the time of her divorce, and thus could not be convicted of adultery.
57. In the landmark Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which struck down a
Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy, Justice Anthony Kennedy, speaking
for the Court, cited Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981), in which
the European Court of Human Rights struck down a British anti-sodomy statute
under the European Convention on Human Rights. See id. at 575. In an address to
the American Law Institute, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor spoke of the importance
of international law as part of American law. See Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Address at the American Law Institute Annual Meeting (May 15, 2002), in 2002 A.L.I.
PROC. 245-51.
58. Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence because some
States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior.
Much less do they spring into existence, as the Court seems to believe, because foreign nations decriminalize conduct. The Court's discussion . . . is
therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since "this Court
... should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans."
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Thomas, J.) (emphasis in original) (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.*
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).
59. For instance, in Pakistan, only English is allowed in the nation's courts.
60. See Somini Sengupta, Facing Death for Adultery, Nigerian Woman Is Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at A3.
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This legal fiction, in the great tradition of the common law, achieved
justice without upsetting the devolution of power to the states and
constituent ethnic groups. It shows the vitality of the common law.
Civilians might have accomplished the same thing through a creative
reading of a code provision; I do not know.
I do know that this is what common law judges have been doing for
centuries, nearly a millennium. And it is clear that sometimes judges
can do the job on a piecemeal basis better than statutes, not all the
time, but sometimes. An illustration is the so-far unsuccessful attempts to create a statute dealing with the licensing of computer
software. Initially, the co-sponsors of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI) considered
revising Article 2 with a "hub" that would cover commercial contracts
generally and "spokes," one of which would have included the licensing of intellectual property. The hub and spoke approach was quickly
abandoned and the licensing spoke cast off to become tentative Article 2B, which originally was to include all forms of licensing, including
motion picture rentals. This proved to cumbersome, so Article 2B
was limited to software. But the drafts submitted were violently attacked as too pro-manufacturer, 61 especially because of concerns over
assent in computerized contracts of adhesion, and the ALI withdrew,
forcing the provision out of the UCC and leading NCCUSL to offer it
as a free-standing uniform act called the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA). 62 As of today, only Maryland and
Virginia have enacted UCITA and NCCUSL is reported to have
abandoned it. Similarly, attempts were made to make clear that Article 2 of the UCC did not cover software, but the ALI opposed this,
preferring to leave the decision up to the courts. In a compromise
with NCCUSL, ALI agreed to a provision stating that "goods" did not
include "information," but leaving that term undefined.6 3 So far, no
states have adopted the amendments to Article 2, and this particular
one is most likely to be controversial.
In a world of computers, the Internet, economic power dispersing to
Europe, South America, Asia, and we can hope, Africa, the common
law can play a creative role in the evolution of law in the third millennium. Hadley shows us one example of how it dealt with earlier turmoil; its spirit will deal well with the future.
61. See STEVEN J. BURTON & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CONTRACT LAW: SELECTED
SOURCE MATERIALS 338 (2004) ("some called it the Microsoft Act").
62. Id.
63. See U.C.C 2-103(k) (Proposed Amendment 2003).
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